New Variants of Agent.BTZ/ComRAT Found: The Threat That Hit The Pentagon In 2008 Still Evolving; Part 2/2 - Intezer

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New Variants of Agent.BTZ/ComRAT Found: The Threat That Hit The Pentagon In 2008 Still Evolving; Part 2/2

Our previous blog post was a short brief of new Agent.BTZ variants that we found. This second part in the series will demonstrate in greater detail exactly how we discovered these new variants.

1. Methodology

To begin, we used our hunting methodology, which consist of four main parts:

  • Collection: Collect multiple samples from different versions.
  • Analysis: Mark functions that have stayed consistent across all versions that are likely to be a part of the next version.
  • Creating a signature: Create a robust yet flexible YARA rule for these functions.
  • Hunting: Search a large repository of files with that YARA rule (VirusTotal, for example).
2.  Why focus on Agent.BTZ?

We chose to focus on Agent.BTZ for several reasons: First, This is one of the oldest state-sponsored threat, developed and operated by the Turla group since (at least) 2007 for dozens of targeted attacks.

Second, there is also a lot of public knowledge regarding Agent.BTZ specifically and Turla group in general available online, including intel reports, technical analyses and malware samples, which we used for our research.  

Third is the fact that this specific malware has remained out of public view for the last two to three years; however, we recognized that it wasn’t likely to disappear–it has just continued to fly under the radar.

3. Do the math

We based our research on an earlier publication from three years ago: “Evolution of sophisticated spyware: from Agent.BTZ to ComRAT” by Paul Rascagnères of GDATA (at the time). In this excellent blog post, Paul described the evolution of Agent.BTZ to ComRAT between 2007-2014 by manually diffing (BinDiff) two different candidates from each major internal hard-coded version (referred by the authors as “Ch” or “PVer”).

The following table shows the code’s similarity between each version to its direct neighbors. By summing up the data in this table we can conclude that, in general, about ~30% of the original code has been used in every version up to the latest known version as of 2014 (marked in red).

** https://www.gdatasoftware.com/blog/2015/01/23927-evolution-of-sophisticated-spyware-from-agent-btz-to-comrat

Obviously this 30% isn’t comprised of totally unique code made by Agent.BTZ’s developers; rather, it is a mixture made of mostly common code that can be found in many more software products (both legit and malware). For example, these could include C Runtime Library or any other 3rd party library such as zlib. Using Intezer’s  technology, we were able to do a ‘deep dive’ into this code, automatically mapping all of the common, library and (most importantly) unique pieces of code created by the malware’s authors.

4. Mysterious magic number

After filtering out all of the common and library code, we were left with several unique functions that can be found in every version of the malware since 2007. The most prominent is the following function:

In the picture you can see the two, almost identical functions from the first version (Ch 1.0) on the right and the latest version (Ch 3.26) of Agent.BTZ on the left. This function is initially reading first four bytes of a given file, and then comparing them for the magic number 0xAAFF1290 (marked in red). If it matches, the function will return true; otherwise, it is false.

So, what is this magic number? Which file is it? We were actually unable to find the function that creates this file within the same binary (ver 3.26). The function shown above is the only reference to that magic number. Luckily, while re-reading old ThreatExpert’s Agent.BTZ analysis from 2008 we happened to notice the following paragraph:

http://blog.threatexpert.com/2008/11/agentbtz-threat-that-hit-pentagon.html

So now we know that this function is used to verify thumb.dd files, which are log/config files leaked over newly-connected USB drives (to overcome air-gapped networks, like those of the Pentagon). But wait… why didn’t we found the function which creates these files? Because the USB-infection vector was removed few years earlier! And yet the adversary is still looking for these valuable thumb.dd files…

5. Hunting for new variants

So far, we know that this function exists, and it has stayed consistent across all versions of the malware; we know what it does (verify certain magic number) and why (detect thumb.dd files leaked from internal network by older versions of the malware). By that information, we can tell that it’s likely to be used in future versions as well.

The next step involves writing a dedicated YARA rule(see appendix) for that specific function and searching for new samples. The rule has to be tolerant to minor changes between versions (mainly due to different compilation flags). Using the VirusTotal Intelligence service, we were able to scan about 2-3 months’ worth of file uploads. As soon as the scan finished, we dug into the results and discovered this first new variant of Agent.BTZ that wasn’t yet mentioned in any public report:

**A screenshot from the Intezer Analyze™ product displaying partial code connections between new sample to old samples of Agent.BTZ(Turla group).

This specific file was supposedly compiled at 2016-07-13 (the timestamp was modified in some of the earlier samples) and uploaded to VT 2017-05-11, which means that this sample is at least two years newer than any previous sample.

6. Main differences between old(3.26) & new samples
  • Filename
    • New file names
      • activeds.dll – proxy dll
      • stdole2.tlb – main payload
  • Exports
    • AddAtomS removed
      • Legacy stub function
    • AddAtomT removed
      • Legacy installation function
    • UnInstallW added
      • Force delete file. Used by new dropper for self delete.
  • PVer(internal version tracking)
    • random version id(see following picture) instead of incremental,

might be due to GDATA’s 2014 publications.

      • For example:
        • 0.8.1529506101
        • 0.9.1528434231
    • Persistence(COM Hijacking)
      • New CLSID
        • {DFFACDC5-679F-4156-8947-C5C76BC0B67F}
  • C2 Infrastructure
  • Config & Log Files
  • Same 512 bytes encryption key as 3.26
  • Different file paths:
  • config: %appdata%\Microsoft\Windows\PrivacIE\High\desktop.ini
  • log: %appdata%\Microsoft\Windows\PrivacIE\High\index.dat
7. Indicators of Compromise
ype indicator notes
sha256 69690f609140db503463daf6a3699f1bf3e2a5a6049cefe7e6437f762040e548 dropper
sha256 6798b3278ae926b0145ee342ee9840d0b2e6ba11ff995c2bc84d3c6eb3e55ff4 dropper
sha256 73db4295c5b29958c5d93c20be9482c1efffc89fc4e5c8ba59ac9425a4657a88 activeds.dll
sha256 50067ebcc2d2069b3613a20b81f9d61f2cd5be9c85533c4ea34edbefaeb8a15f activeds.dll
sha256 380b0353ba8cd33da8c5e5b95e3e032e83193019e73c71875b58ec1ed389bdac activeds.dll
sha256 9c163c3f2bd5c5181147c6f4cf2571160197de98f496d16b38c7dc46b5dc1426 activeds.dll
sha256 628d316a983383ed716e3f827720915683a8876b54677878a7d2db376d117a24 activeds.dll
sha256 f27e9bba6a2635731845b4334b807c0e4f57d3b790cecdc77d8fef50629f51a2 activeds.dll
sha256 a093fa22d7bc4ee99049a29b66a13d4bf4d1899ed4c7a8423fbb8c54f4230f3c activeds.dll
sha256 6ad78f069c3619d0d18eef8281219679f538cfe0c1b6d40b244beb359762cf96 stdole2.tlb
sha256 49c5c798689d4a54e5b7099b647b0596fb96b996a437bb8241b5dd76e974c24e stdole2.tlb
sha256 e88970fa4892150441c1616028982fe63c875f149cd490c3c910a1c091d3ad49 stdole2.tlb
sha256 89db8a69ff030600f26d5c875785d20f15d45331d007733be9a2422261d16cea stdole2.tlb
ip 81.199.34[.]150
dns elephant.zzux[.]com
dns angrybear.ignorelist[.]com
dns bigalert.mefound[.]com
dns bughouse.yourtrap[.]com
dns getfreetools.strangled[.]net
dns news100top.diskstation[.]org
dns pro100sport.mein-vigor[.]de
dns redneck.yourtrap[.]com
dns savage.2waky[.]com
dns tehnologtrade.4irc[.]com
ip 81.199.160[.]11
dns forums.chatnook[.]com
dns goodengine.darktech[.]org
dns locker.strangled[.]net
dns simple-house.zzux[.]com
dns specialcar.mooo[.]com
dns sunseed.strangled[.]net
dns whitelibrary.4irc[.]com
dns bloodpearl.strangled[.]net
dns getlucky.ignorelist[.]com
dns proriot.zzux[.]com
dns fourapi.mooo[.]com
dns nopasaran.strangled[.]net
ip 78.138.25[.]29
dns showme.twilightparadox[.]com
dns mouses.strangled[.]net
ip 82.146.175[.]69
dns mouses.strangled[.]net
ip 178.219.68[.]242
dns ftp.fueldust.compress[.]to
dns ftp.linear.wikaba[.]com
dns ftp.mysterysoft.epac[.]to
dns ftp.scroller.longmusic[.]com
dns ftp.spartano.mefound[.]com
dns fueldust.compress[.]to
dns linear.wikaba[.]com
dns mysterysoft.epac.to
dns safety.deaftone[.]com
dns salary.flnet[.]org
dns scroller.longmusic[.]com
dns spartano.mefound[.]com
ip 88.83.25[.]122
dns robot.wikaba[.]com
ip 41.223.91[.]217
dns smileman.compress[.]to
dns decent.ignorelist[.]com
dns dekka.biz[.]tm
dns disol.strangled[.]net
dns eraser.2waky[.]com
dns filelord.epac[.]to
dns justsoft.epac[.]to
dns smuggler.zzux[.]com
dns sport-journal.twilightparadox[.]com
dns sportinfo.yourtrap[.]com
dns stager.ignorelist[.]com
dns tankos.wikaba[.]com
dns grandfathers.mooo[.]com
dns homeric.mooo[.]com
dns jamming.mooo[.]com
dns pneumo.mooo[.]com
dns razory.mooo[.]com
dns anger.scieron[.]com
dns gantama.mefound[.]com
dns letgetbad.epac[.]to
dns rowstate.epac[.]to
dns memento.info[.]tm
ip 196.43.240[.]177
dns bughouse.yourtrap[.]com
dns news100top.diskstation[.]org
ip 169.255.102[.]240
dns harm17.zzux[.]com
dns mountain8.wikaba[.]com
sha256 0e0045d2c4bfff4345d460957a543e2e7f1638de745644f6bf58555c1d287286 other
sha256 bdcc7e900f10986cdb6dc7762de35b4f07f2ee153a341bef843b866e999d73a3 other
sha256 fac13f08afe2745fc441ada37120cebce0e0aa16d03a03e9cda3ec9384dd40f2 backdoor
sha256 bae62f7f96c4cc300ec685f42eb451388cf50a13aa624b3f2a019d071fddaeb1 other

 

Related articles:

  1. https://www.gdatasoftware.com/blog/2014/11/23937-the-uroburos-case-new-sophisticated-rat-identified
  2. https://www.gdatasoftware.com/blog/2015/01/23927-evolution-of-sophisticated-spyware-from-agent-btz-to-comrat
  3. http://blog.threatexpert.com/2008/11/agentbtz-threat-that-hit-pentagon.html
  4. https://securelist.com/satellite-turla-apt-command-and-control-in-the-sky/72081/
  5. https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/waterbug-attack-group.pdf
  6. https://securelist.com/the-epic-turla-operation/65545/
  7. http://artemonsecurity.com/snake_whitepaper.pdf
  8. https://www.gdatasoftware.com/blog/2015/01/23926-analysis-of-project-cobra
By Omri Ben Bassat

Ex-officer in the IDF-CERT. Malware analyst and Reverse Engineer with vast experience in dealing with Nation-sponsored cyber attacks. | omri@intezer.com

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